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Justice for Nazi and Communist Era Property
Expropriation Through International
Investment Arbitration
KATHRYN LEE BOYD, THOMAS WATSON AND KARLY VALENZUELA
I. INTRODUCTION
In the more than seventy years since the end of World War II and
the more than twenty-five years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Poland
has not passed comprehensive legislation to provide restitution or just
compensation for property that the Nazis or Communists unlawfully
expropriated. As a result, the vast majority of the surviving property
owners and their heirs, including Holocaust survivors, have not had any
measure of justice. Poland is not alone in its failure. Other former
Communist countries, including Romania, have implemented legislation
to address unlawful expropriation, but this legislation has failed to
provide justice because of corruption in the judiciary, the government,
and the legal profession. Neither restitution nor just compensation has
been provided to the victims consistently.
To date, most legal efforts to address these failures have been either
through use of the existing domestic legal regimes or through the
European Court of Human Rights. Both of these avenues have yielded
limited success. Yet one potential remedy—arbitration under states’
bilateral investment treaties—has been entirely overlooked. For select
cases that meet the legal and practical criteria for bilateral investment
treaty arbitration, this international remedy should provide a valuable
means to address the continuing failure by Poland and other countries to
provide restitution or just compensation for Nazi and Communist era
takings.

 Kathryn Lee Boyd and Thomas Watson are principals, and Karly Valenzuela is an associate, at
the law firm of McKool Smith, PC. They practice litigation and arbitration with an emphasis on
international matters. Robert Mockler, Matthew Rand, Juliya Arbisman, Parvan Parvanov, Crina
Baltag, Brian Kramer and Michael Bazyler provided valuable assistance to the authors.
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II. BACKGROUND: PROPERTY EXPROPRIATION
During and after World War II, many countries in Central and
Eastern Europe engaged in mass expropriations of property. As is welldocumented, as the Nazis seized power, they persecuted disfavored
groups, including political activists, the handicapped, homosexuals,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Roma, and the Jews, whom they particularly
targeted for “utter annihilation.” 1 The Nazis and their agents confiscated
real property, businesses, art, jewelry, and anything else of value. Others
took over property after its owners fled from, or were killed by, the Nazis.
Following World War II, some survivors or their heirs returned to
reclaim their property. In Poland, for example, many Jews who had fled
to Russia or elsewhere returned to Warsaw, filing claims for their real
property under the Bierut Decree. At the same time, Communists in
Poland seized and consolidated their power. Once they took control,
Poland rejected or never acted upon most post-war claims for the return
of property under the Bierut Decree. Instead, Poland simply took control
of most of the properties previously expropriated by the Nazis.
Communist governments in Poland and elsewhere in Central and
Eastern Europe also targeted portions of their populations and
expropriated additional real estate and businesses that had not been taken
by the Nazis. For example, in Romania, the Communist takeover that
started in 1945 and consolidated in 1947 when Romania was declared a
“people’s democracy,” brought with it a concerted state-led campaign
designed to change the entire property structure of the State. The
Romanian government sought to eradicate foreign property (other than
Soviet-Romanian joint forums), reduce private property ownership to a
minimum, and greatly expand state property (equated with “the property
of all people”). The Romanian government’s policies actively targeted
and discriminated against businesses owned and operated by foreigners,
and ethnic or religious minorities. Expropriation of private property was
codified in a series of legislation, including Law 187/1945,
Law119/1948, and Decree 303/1948.

1. See Yad Vashem World Holocaust Remembrance Ctr., Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/docs/FAQ%20Holocaust%20EN%20Yad
%20Vashem.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). For more information on the background of
Holocaust-era stolen property in Eastern Europe, see EUROPEAN S HOAH L EGACY INST.,
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY RESTITUTION S TUDY 2014–2017,
http://www.shoahlegacy.org/storage/app/media/2.1
/2.1.4.2%20Immovable%20Property%20Restitution%20Study.pdf; MICHAEL BAZYLER,
HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE AND THE L AW: A Q UEST FOR JUSTICE IN A POST-HOLOCAUST WORLD
(2016).
UN.ORG,
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Thus, property in Poland, Romania, and in much of the rest of
Central and Eastern Europe was often subjected to two confiscations.
III. POST-COMMUNISM RESTITUTION EFFORTS HAVE LARGELY F AILED
Despite having enshrined rights to property in their new
constitutions, many post-Soviet Bloc countries still struggle to address
restitution of private property belonging to citizens who (i) were killed in
the Holocaust, (ii) were killed in the War, (iii) were forced to flee, or (iv)
had their property nationalized by the Communists. Failing to address
these wrongful takings perpetuates the injustices of the War and
Communist era. This failure is particularly egregious in Poland, the preWar home of millions of Jews who were killed or displaced during the
War. Poland now benefits from its use of billions of dollars of property
that is lawfully the property of the Jewish survivors and their families.
The failure to provide restitution or just compensation for these
takings violates international norms. International law generally requires
countries to provide restitution or just compensation for unlawful takings
of property of foreign citizens by a state. Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law § 185 (1965) provides that:
The taking by a state of property of an alien is wrongful under
international law if either:
(a) it is not for a public purpose,
(b) there is not reasonable provision for the determination and
payment of just compensation, as defined in § 187, under the law and
practice of the state in effect at the time of taking, or
(c) the property is merely in transit through the territory of the state,
or has otherwise been temporarily subjected to its jurisdiction, and is
not required by the state because of serious emergency. 2

Similarly, Section 186 provides that: “[f]ailure of a state to pay just
compensation for taking the property of an alien is wrongful under
international law, regardless of whether the taking itself was wrongful
under international law.”3
In the context of the Holocaust, all takings violate international law.
As held by the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, genocidal expropriations constitute “tak[ings] in violation of
international law.”4

2. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 185 (1965).
3. Id. § 186.
4. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3)).

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

680

12/12/2018 6:34 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 41:3

Further, restitution or just compensation is a moral imperative.
Among other moral bases for restituting property, particularly in the
context of the takings during and right after the War, the theory of
restorative justice provides a conceptual framework for repairing the
harms caused by the mass crimes of the Holocaust and post-war property
thefts by Soviet Bloc regimes. 5 Restorative justice makes central the
experiences and needs (material, emotional, and moral) of victims—and
the heirs of the victims—and returns ownership over the resolution of the
wrong, crime and harm to those primarily affected (i.e., survivors) and
those who are in a position to make meaningful reparations (i.e., postCommunist governments). Restorative justice emphasizes material and
practical solutions to address victims’ losses, and restitution and
compensation in a restorative framework play instrumental and symbolic
roles in repairing relationships from the perspective of the victims. 6
Now, decades after the transition to democracy, there still has been
little or no justice for many pre-War property owners and their heirs. No
adjudication by impartial tribunals. No restitution to the original owners
or their heirs. No compensation paid under internationally-acceptable
standards of “just compensation.” 7 And the time to provide even a small
measure of justice to the survivors is quickly vanishing, as it is more than
seventy years since the end of the War.
It is true that, following the fall of the Iron Curtain, many former
Eastern Bloc countries have instituted property restitution or
compensation schemes or allowed civil court proceedings that address
restitution or compensation. These efforts, however, have in many cases
provided no effective remedy at all for at least three reasons. First, most
survivors and their heirs never learn of their rights because the schemes
include inadequate provisions for notifying potential claimants. Second,
the restitution schemes fail to provide adequate procedural and
substantive provisions. For example, many contain severe limitations on
the ability of claimants to seek restitution or compensation, such as time
limitations, citizenship requirements or other legal hurdles to proving a
claim, and most also severely limit the remedies available. Third, the
5. See generally Margaret Urban Walker, Restorative Justice and Reparations, 37 J. SOC.
PHIL. 377 (2006).
6. See 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE D ISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2:39 (4th ed. 2017); see
generally Lee Taft, When More Than Sorry Matters 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 181 (2013). See
also CENTRE FOR JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION, http://restorativejustice.org/#sthash.
VDQ1wa5s.dpbs (last visited May 20, 2018).
7. See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, LEE CRAWFORD BOYD, KRISTEN L. NELSON, AND R AJIKA L.
SHAH, SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE: F ULFILLING THE TEREZIN DECLARATION AND POST-HOLOCAUST
IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY RESTITUTION (forthcoming 2019).
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schemes fail because of the: (i) weakness of the newly-established
democratic institutions, including incompetence and corruption in the
government and judiciary, (ii) opportunism by those who found
themselves in political leadership post-communism, (iii) fraud by
opportunists posing as pre-war owners, or (iv) difficulty in balancing the
competing interests of the tenants occupying stolen real estate and the
original owners who were illegally deprived of their private property. 8
Poland has allowed restitution and compensation claims to be
brought in its court system. For example, the remedy of restitution (via a
perpetual usufruct) is provided for by the 2016 Small Reprivatization
Statute and the 1945 Bierut Decree for confiscated private property in
Warsaw. But these processes are deeply flawed and wholly inadequate;
claims take years to be addressed, are subject to cumbersome, if not
corrupt, court procedures, and often result in the denial of objectively
valid claims.
Moreover, Poland, alone among major European countries, has
failed to pass comprehensive legislation to address restitution and
compensation. While the Polish government has recently published
proposed “comprehensive” legislation to address confiscations, 9 the
proposed law would in fact prevent most persons, including Holocaust
survivors, from obtaining any restitution or compensation.
The proposed “reprivatization” law fails to meet basic standards of
international law requiring non-discrimination, due process, and fair and
equitable treatment of foreign nationals before courts and administrative
tribunals. Most egregiously, as described below, this newly proposed law
would (i) extinguish all pending cases where property owners are
attempting to enforce their rights to some remedy under Polish law, and
(ii) exclude most foreigners from restitution, specifically Jewish
survivors of the Holocaust (who fled Poland or were sent to concentration
camps outside of Poland) and their heirs (who settled outside of Poland
after communism).10

8. See generally Brian Kramer, A Crusading Lawyer’s Battle for Restitution, HAMODIA (Oct.
24, 2017), http://hamodia.com/features/crusading-lawyers-battle-restitution/.
9. See Duża Ustawa Reprywatyzacyjna [Large Reprivatisation Act] Ministerstwo
Sprawiedliwości
[Ministry
of
Justice]
(Oct.
20,
2017)
https://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/informacje/news,9903,duza-ustawa-reprywatyzacyjna.html.
10. See Yitz Wiener, World Jewish Restitution Organization “Profoundly Disappointed” at
Proposed Polish Property Legislation that would Exclude Vast Majority of Holocaust Survivors
and Their Families, WORLD JEWISH RESTITUTION ORG. (Oct. 23, 2017), https://wjro.org.il/worldjewish-restitution-organization-profoundly-disappointed-proposed-polish-property-legislationexclude-vast-majority-holocaust-survivors-families/.
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The experience in Romania is similar. While Romania did pass
restitution legislation, there is documented corruption within the
restitution mechanisms put in place. Romania’s legal system does not
operate independently of the government, and the judiciary is not
functional or independent. In the 2001 Regular Reports, the European
Commission noted the disappointing implementation of the restitution
laws. 11 As the 2016 European Union’s monitoring report reiterated,
“[t]here are improved steps to tackle general corruption, but not on the
scale and with the political will required to address what is widely
recognised as a systemic problem.”12
A common tactic that is used in Romania is to unreasonably prolong
restitution proceedings through a seemingly never-ending cycle of
appeals and reviews.13 The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”)
has found Romania in violation of the Convention on Human Rights on
several occasions, “in view of the ineffectiveness of the restitution system
and, in particular, of delays in the procedure for payment of
compensation.”14 According to the Annual Report of the National
Property Restitution Authority, ten years after the entry into force of
Romania’s first property restitution law, Law 10/2001, forty percent of
over 200,000 claims registered under that law remained unresolved.
IV. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION PROVIDES A VALUABLE REMEDY
FOR S TATES’ F AILURE TO PROVIDE RESTITUTION OR J UST COMPENSATION
FOR NAZI AND COMMUNIST ERA EXPROPRIATIONS
An overlooked mechanism for seeking justice for property
expropriated by the Nazis or Communists is international arbitration
under bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”). Claimants who meet certain
11. See Comm’n of the Eur. Communities, Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards
Accession, SEC (2001) 1753 (Nov. 13, 2001).
12. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in
Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, at 13, COM (2016) 41 final (Jan.
27, 2016).
13. See European Commission Press Release Speech/13/677, Justice Commissioner, The EU
and the Rule of Law – What next? (Sep. 4, 2013); Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism, at 6, COM (2015) 35 final (Jan. 28, 2015) (making a number of additional
recommendations in judicial reform, independence and integrity, as well as the fight against
corruption, meant “to make the justice more efficient and accountable and to increase its quality.”).
14. Atanasiu v. Romania, App. Nos. 30767/05, 33800/06, Final Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 183
(Oct. 12, 2010) (citing Viaşu v. Romania, App. No. 75951/01, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 71-72
(Dec. 9, 2008)). See Matache and Others v. Romania, App. No. 38113/02, Decision, Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶ 42 (Oct. 19, 2006).
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jurisdictional requirements may commence an international arbitration
against countries that have failed to provide remedies for illegally
confiscated properties, or countries where there are remedies but no
effective means to obtain them, by utilizing the provisions of relevant
BITs. Through the use of BITs’ dispute resolution procedures, claimants
may bring claims where, for example, the state has failed to provide
effective means through which the claimant could pursue her claims or
where the claimant has not been accorded fair and equitable treatment by
the state’s courts. BITs can thus provide a means for righting some of the
wrongs of past illegal confiscations and a solution for the ongoing failure
to provide compensation and restitution.
The now-ubiquitous BITs are agreements made between two
countries that establish the terms and conditions, including rights and
protections, for private investment by nationals and companies of one
signatory in the territory of the other. Poland has approximately sixty
BITs currently in force, entered into in the late 1980s and 1990s,
including ones with Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States.15
Similarly, Romania has seventy-eight BITs currently in force. 16 Other
Central and Eastern European nations also have entered into numerous
BITs.17
Many BITs contain broad substantive protections and compulsory
arbitration clauses that offer a method of resolving disputes that may
prove to be quite effective for claimants facing the barriers of corrupt
governments and ineffective or non-existent restitution laws. Most BITs
are separated into several sections. The following are the most relevant
for the topics discussed in this article: (1) a definition section, which often
includes a broad definition for the “investments” covered by the BIT; (2)
a list of the obligations, protections, and prohibitions the contracting
states have agreed to adhere to with regard to the foreign investments of
investors from the other signatory; (3) standards for expropriation and
compensation; and (4) dispute resolution provisions.
The following sections briefly discuss how claimants might have
jurisdiction to raise an investment treaty claim and the types of claims
that could be brought under the various provisions of typical BITs.

15. See Poland—Bilateral Investment Treaties, INVESTMENT P OLICY HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/168 (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
16. See
Romania—Bilateral
Investment
Treaties,
INV.
POLICY
H UB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/174 (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
17. See generally International Investment Agreements Navigator, INV. POLICY HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
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A. Important Definitions
1. “National” of a Contracting State
The investment arbitration regime is based on the principle that its
protections extend to investors who are nationals of a state other than the
state in which the investment is made (i.e., the host state).18 As a
preliminary matter, the claimant’s nationality determines whether the
investment may benefit from protection under a BIT and which BIT
applies.
The term “national” is typically defined in the relevant BIT. For
example, in the U.S.-Poland BIT, “national” is defined as “a natural
person who is a national of a Party under its applicable law.” 19 The United
States Model BIT defines “national” of the United States as “a natural
person who is a national of the United States as defined in Title III of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.” 20 The U.S. Immigration and
Nationality Act defines “national of the United States” as: “(A) a citizen
of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.”21 Thus, a
U.S. citizen could bring an investment claim against Poland under the
U.S.-Poland BIT.
Without going into too much detail, the ability to bring investment
claims under BITs becomes more complicated if the claimant is a dual
national. The general rule is that when the claimant is an individual with
dual nationality of the two contracting parties, the individual: (i) is
precluded from pursuing a claim at the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), 22 but (ii) may not be
precluded, in the non-ICSID context, from pursuing a claim against the
state where the investment is found, “but to do so must demonstrate that
her home state nationality is predominant both at the date of the alleged
injury and at the date of the submission of the claim.” 23
In the case of private property restitution, BITs thus provide an
avenue for diaspora who had their investments expropriated by their
18. See CAMPBELL MCL ACHLAN, L AURENCE S HORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: S UBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 156 (2017).
19. Treaty Concerning Business and Economic Relations, U.S.-Poland, art. I, Mar. 21, 1990,
29 I.L.M. 1194 (entered into force Aug. 6, 1994) [hereinafter U.S.-Poland BIT].
20. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1 (model treaty).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1993).
22. ICSID Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other
States, art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
23. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 183.
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original homeland, as well as for their heirs who have begun new lives
outside of the original homeland, to bring claims.
2. Expropriated Property as BIT “Investments”
A threshold question to the jurisdiction of an investment treaty
tribunal is whether the claimants have an “investment” in the territory of
the respondent state that is covered by the definition provided in the BIT.
Most BITs with western countries that were entered into postcommunism—and therefore decades after the confiscations at issue—
have broad definitions of “investment,” which include claims to property
and money.
For example, the U.S.-Romania BIT expressly covers “every kind
of investment in the territory” of one state owned or controlled directly
or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other state, “such as equity,
debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes:”
(i) movable and immovable, property and tangible and intangible
property, including rights such as mortgages, liens and pledges;
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or
interest in the assets thereof;
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic
value, and associated with an investment;
(iv) intellectual and industrial property which includes, inter alia,
rights relating to: literary and artistic works, including sound recordings;
inventions in all fields of human endeavor; industrial designs;
semiconductor mask works; trade secrets, know-how, and confidential
business information; and trademarks, service marks, and trade names;
and
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, including concessions to
to [sic] search for, extract, or exploit natural resources, and any license
and permits pursuant to law. 24
The plain language encompasses the typical types of private
property being sought by the victims of the Nazi and communist regimes,
such as buildings and companies. In many instances, several of the
categories enumerated in the BITs may cover claims to such property.
For example, where the Communists took over ownership of a factory
seized by the Nazis, the owners would have (i) an investment in
“property,” i.e., ownership of the factory building (since the seizure itself
was unlawful and therefore not a lawful change of title) and (ii) an
24. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Rom.U.S., art. I, May 28, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-26 (entered into force Jan.15, 1994)
[hereinafter Rom.-U.S. BIT].
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investment in that they have a “claim to money” for the expropriation.
Similarly, the factory may have been owned by a company, giving the
owners an investment in “a company or shares of stock or other interests
in a company or interest in the assets thereof.”25
Further, each of these investments would therefore have been in
existence at the time the BIT became effective, usually in the 1990s, and
accordingly should be covered under the BIT’s jurisdictional provisions.
For example, the U.S.-Poland BIT provides, “[t]his Treaty shall apply to
investments and associated activities and to commercial activities
existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or
acquired and commercial activities undertaken while this Treaty is in
force.”26
Nonetheless, countries may argue that the actual wrongful conduct
predated the BITs and therefore should not be covered. However, a claim
to restitution of the factory discussed above, for example, is arguably one
where original ownership never lawfully passed to the Communists
because the original taking violated international law. Thus, the wrongful
act, i.e., possession in violation of international law, continues to the
present day and therefore falls within the BITs’ purview.
Similarly, claims to money were in existence “at the time of entry
into force” so they too should be covered “investments.” Importantly, a
claim to money persists even if the original investment no longer exists. 27
This means that, even if the original property has been destroyed, a
claimant could still bring a claim under the BIT because her claim to
money still exists as a valid investment.
Survivors and their heirs may have another “investment” as a result
of a state’s actions in connection with restitution. A state may create a
new right to property, or revive a right, by passage of a restitution law or,
where claims are brought in a state, by acknowledging the claim to the
property or compensation. The state thereby recognizes a proprietary
interest that is an “investment” since it is a “claim to money” or a “claim

25. See e.g., id.
26. U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 19, art. XIV.
27. See, e.g., Jan de Nul N.V., Dredging Int’l N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 135 (June 16, 2006) (agreeing with the proposition that
“not only is it stated ‘nowhere . . . that the investment should still be in existence when the dispute
arises’ but also and more importantly, ‘should this be the case the entire logic of investment
protection treaties would be defeated’”); Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic
of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Interim Award, ¶¶ 191-193 (Dec. 1, 2008)
(interpreting definition of “investment” to “resolve[] the concern expressed in . . . Jan de Nul that
an investor whose investment was definitely expropriated would hold a claim to compensation but
would technically no longer hold any existing ‘investment’”).
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to performance having economic value.” 28 An agency or administrative
decision by the local authority recognizing that a previous owner of
property is entitled to reparation for a pre-BIT expropriation may also
create a proprietary interest that is an “investment” under the BIT in the
form of a claim to money or claim to performance. If the state then
expropriates that claim to money or claim to performance or denies the
owner of the claim protections afforded by the BIT and customary
international law, this gives rise to an expropriation claim under the BIT
that post-dates the enactment of the BIT.29
The ECHR has found that these types of actions by the state are
sufficient to give rise to a proprietary interest protected by the Convention
on Human Rights. “An administrative decision by the local authority
recognizing the applicant’s entitlement to compensation was sufficient to
give rise to a ‘proprietary interest’ protected by Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 [of the Convention on Human Rights and] consequently, the failure to
enforce that decision amounted to interference with the meaning of the
first paragraph of that Article.” 30 The ECHR has also found that “failure
to enforce an administrative decision recognizing entitlement to
compensation and fixing the amount”31 and that “failure to enforce a court
28. Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. I(iii).
29. ATA Construction, Industrial & Trading Co. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/2, Award (May 18, 2010) is instructive here. The claims in ATA v. Jordan related
to the annulment by the Jordanian courts of a final arbitral award rendered in favor of claimant,
following a dispute over the collapse of a dike constructed by the claimant for an entity controlled
by the Jordanian state. The claimant submitted that the violations of the applicable BIT included,
among other things, the unlawful expropriation of the claimant’s claims to money and rights to
legitimate performance under the construction contract and the final arbitral award. Id. ¶ 37. The
tribunal had no difficulty deciding that the claims to money arising out of the construction contract,
including the arbitration dispute, constitute an investment. The tribunal based its rationale on the
fact that “an investment is not a single right but is, like property, correctly conceived of as a bundle
of rights, some of which are inseparable from others and some of which are comparatively freestanding.” Id. ¶ 96. For this reason, the tribunal concluded that the right to arbitration is a distinct
“investment” within the meaning of the BIT because [the BIT] defines an investigation inter alia
as “claims to . . . any other rights to legitimate performance having financial value related to an
investment.” The right to arbitration could hardly be considered something other than a “right . . .
to legitimate performance having financial value related to an investment.” Id. ¶ 117.
30. Atanasiu v. Romania, App. Nos. 30767/05, 33800/06, Final Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 183
(Oct. 12, 2010) (citing Viaşu v. Romania, App. No. 75951/01, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 71-72
(Dec. 9, 2008)). See Rădulescu v. Romania, App. No. 15851/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 20-22 (May 27,
2010), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-98870%22]}; Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952,
213 U.N.T.S. 2889 (“[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions.”).
31. Atanasiu v. Romania, App. Nos. 30767/05, 33800/06, Final Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 181
(Oct. 12, 2010) (citing Elias v. Romania, App. No. 32800/02, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 21 (May
12, 2009)).

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

688

12/12/2018 6:34 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 41:3

decision recognizing entitlement to compensation, even where the
amount of the award has not been fixed” constitute violations of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on Human Rights.32
Thus, depending on the definition of “investment” in the relevant
BIT, an investment may exist when a state acknowledges an individual’s
entitlement to compensation for the expropriated property. If those new
interests are then expropriated or not provided with the fair and equitable
administrative and judicial treatment required under the applicable BIT,
a BIT claim arises and jurisdiction would be satisfied.
B. Obligations and Protections Provided for in BITs
The substantive rules guaranteed to “investors” and applicable to
their expropriation claims are grounded in the text of the relevant bilateral
treaty. Generally, the obligations undertaken by the signatories to a BIT
require these countries to provide the investments of the state’s investors
with the following: (1) fair and equitable treatment; (2) full protection
and security; (3) treatment no less favorable than that required by
international law; (4) national treatment, which means treatment as
favorable as that provided to the nationals of its own country; (5) most
favored nation treatment, which means treatment as favorable as that
given to nationals of third-party countries; and (6) effective means of
asserting claims and enforcing rights when disputes arise out of their
investments.33
Additionally, BITs generally include provisions that prohibit the
states from engaging in conduct or implementing measures that are
arbitrary or discriminatory to foreign investments. 34 Some BITs also
require that a government observe its own obligations established by the
state to protect investors, a provision commonly referred to as an
“umbrella clause.”35
With respect to Nazi and Communist era takings, potential BIT
claims may invoke some or all of these investment protections depending
on the facts of a given case. For example, a Holocaust survivor who
brought claims for an expropriation in the Polish national courts but who
did not receive fair and equitable treatment by those courts may have a

32. Atanasiu v. Romania, App. Nos. 30767/05, 33800/06, Final Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 182
(Oct. 12, 2010) (citing Denes and Others v. Romania, App. No. 25862/03, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶¶ 46-47 (Mar. 3, 2009)).
33. See, e.g., U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 19, arts. 1-2.
34. See, e.g., Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. II(2)(b).
35. See, e.g., id., art. II(2)(c) (“Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered
into with regard to investments.”).
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claim for breach of the fair and equitable treatment and effective means
provisions of the applicable BIT.
Breach of one or more treaty obligations by the state triggers its
international responsibility and liability to compensate the investor for
damages resulting from the breach.
1. Obligation to Accord Investments Fair and Equitable Treatment
Foreign investors are typically entitled to “fair and equitable
treatment,” which generally means that the host state assumes an
obligation to protect the investors’ “legitimate and reasonable
expectations” to treatment above the minimum standard of international
law. 36
The fair and equitable treatment standard is broad, and at least some
tribunals have concluded that its meaning depends on the specific
circumstances of the case at issue. As pointed out by the Mondev v.
United States tribunal, a “judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot
be reached in the abstract; it must depend on the facts of the particular
case.”37 Similarly, the Waste Management v. Mexico tribunal noted, “the
standard is to some extent a flexible one which must be adapted to the
circumstances of each case.”38
It is generally agreed, however, that the recurrent elements of the
fair and equitable treatment clause are the following: (i) protection of the
investor’s legitimate expectations; (ii) transparency; (iii) compliance with
contractual obligations; (iv) protection against denial of justice (i.e.,
procedural propriety and due process); (v) good faith; and (vi) freedom
from coercion and harassment.39
a. Judicial: Denial of Justice
The requirement for fair and equitable treatment encompasses
claims for denial of justice. 40 This means that a denial of justice in the
36. See Saluka Inv. B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Case No. 2001-04, Partial
Award, ¶ 302 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006). See also Saluka Inv. B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech
Republic, Case No. 2001-04, Partial Award, ¶¶ 285-309 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006) (discussing the FET
standard as protecting an investor’s legitimate expectations).
37. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
Award, ¶ 118 (Oct. 11, 2002).
38. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2, ¶ 99 (May
26, 2000).
39. See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law
145 (2012); Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Development
118, in August Reinisch, Standards of Investment Protection (2008); Ioana Tudor, The Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard in International Law of Foreign Investment 154 (2008).
40. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 297.
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national courts itself constitutes a violation of the fair and equitable
treatment standard under the BIT. Denial of justice can take different
forms; the most common claims made are denial of access to courts,
unreasonable delay, lack of due process, and bias, fraud, dishonesty, or
lack of impartiality by the judiciary. 41
b. Legislative: Lack of Regulatory Stability
The requirement for fair and equitable treatment is breached by (i)
the introduction of regulations that operate in a discriminatory or arbitrary
fashion against the foreign investor, 42 or (ii) state regulatory changes that
have a cumulative effect of completely altering the regulatory framework
in such a way that virtually eliminates the investor’s reasonably expected
benefits.43
c. Executive: Lack of Due Process and Substantive Unfairness
The requirement for fair and equitable treatment may be breached
by (i) “a complete lack of transparency and candour in an administrative
process” or otherwise by “a manifest failure of natural justice” 44 or (ii)
where the impugned measures are substantively “arbitrary, grossly
unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic . . . discriminatory [or] exposes the
claimant to sectional or racial prejudice.”45
2. Prohibition Against Discriminatory Treatment
Many BITs guarantee non-discriminatory treatment of foreign
investments. In the context of investment arbitration, the relevant
discrimination is with regard to nationality. Poland, for example, would
be in violation of this basic standard if it were to enact restitution laws
that only benefit Polish citizens.

41. See, e.g., JAN P AULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL L AW 176-206 (2005);
Rumeli Telekom A.S. & Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 654 (July 28, 2008); Robert Azinian, Kenneth
Davitian, & Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, ¶¶
102-103 (Nov. 1, 1999).
42. See, e.g., Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, ¶
233 (Mar. 31, 2010).
43. See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶
517 (Oct. 31, 2011).
44. See, e.g., Waste Management, ICSID ARB(AF)/98/2 ¶ 98.
45. Id.
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3. Prohibition Against Arbitrary and Discriminatory Measures
Whether an arbitrary and discriminatory measure has been
employed by the state’s judicial or administrative process overlaps to
some extent with the standard of fair and equitable treatment. Therefore,
one particular set of facts may violate both the fair and equitable
treatment standard and the prohibition against arbitrary and
discriminatory measures.
a. Arbitrary Measures
An arbitrary measure has been characterized as “a wilful disregard
of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense
of juridical propriety.”46 “[T]he underlying notion of arbitrariness is that
prejudice, preference or bias is substituted for the rule of law.” 47
b. Discriminatory Measures
There are different types of protection against discrimination
available in most BITs. For example, the U.S.-Romania BIT provides:
Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities
associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in
like situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals
or companies, or of nationals or companies of any third country,
whichever is the most favorable.48
Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory
measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment,
acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments. 49
The BIT language specifically provides for protection against
discrimination on the basis of nationality by stating that the investments
of the contracting parties cannot be treated less favorably than national
investments (often called the “national treatment” standard); it also
provides protection against discrimination on the basis of nationality by
stating that the investments of the contracting parties cannot be treated
less favorably than any third country investments (often called the “most
favored nation” standard).
In BG Group Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, the tribunal noted
that a measure in breach of the national treatment or most favored nation
46. Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) v. Italy, Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15, ¶ 128 (July 20,
1989).
47. Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision, ¶ 263 (Mar.
28, 2011).
48. Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. II(1).
49. Id. art. II(2)(b).
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standards would inevitably be discriminatory in relation to the provision
on arbitrary or discriminatory measures. 50 Thus, the prohibition against
arbitrary and discriminatory measures should encompass all forms of
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of nationality.
4. The State’s Obligation to Provide Effective Means to Assert Claims
and Enforce Rights
The effective means clause is a guarantee that investors and their
investments all be granted actual and proper mechanisms to assert their
claims and enforce their rights when necessary. Article II(6) of the U.S.Romania BIT provides an example: “Each Party shall provide effective
means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment,
investment agreements, and investment authorizations.”51 The language
in this clause envisions not only the existence of the proper mechanisms
for asserting claims and enforcing rights, but also that these mechanisms
be effective.
While the right to effective means is an independent and specific
treaty obligation, claims for denial of justice go hand in hand with claims
that a state has failed to provide effective means to assert claims and
enforce rights. 52 Thus, it seems to be the case that many of the same
claims can be brought under both provisions. In Chevron v. Ecuador, for
example, the tribunal compared the effective means standard with the
rules on denial of justice. 53 The tribunal found that the effective means
standard is “distinct and potentially less demanding” than the denial of
justice standard.54 Accordingly, “a failure of domestic courts to enforce
rights ‘effectively’ will constitute a violation of the effective means
standard, which may not always be sufficient to find a denial of justice
under customary international law.”55
The effective means standard applies to a variety of state conduct
having an effect on the investor’s ability to assert claims or enforce
rights.56 In Chevron, the tribunal applied the effective means standard to
50. See BG Grp., Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶ 355, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
51. Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. II(6).
52. Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶ 391 (Aug. 18, 2008) (noting that the effective means clause “guarantees
the access to the courts and the existence of institutional mechanisms for the protection of
investments. As such, it seeks to implement and form part of the more general guarantee against
denial of justice.”).
53. See Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador, Partial Award
on the Merits, ¶ 244, IIC 421 (Mar. 30, 2010).
54. Chevron Corporation, ¶ 244.
55. Id.
56. See id. ¶ 248.
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the claim that the Ecuadorian courts had unreasonably delayed resolving
the claimant’s lawsuits.57 The tribunal reasoned that “[f]or any ‘means’
of asserting claims or enforcing rights to be effective, it must not be
subject to indefinite or undue delay. Undue delay in effect amounts to a
denial of access to those means.” 58 Under the effective means standard,
Ecuador’s legal system was required to provide foreign investors with the
means of enforcing legitimate rights within a reasonable time.

57. See id. ¶ 249.
58. Id. ¶ 250.

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

694

12/12/2018 6:34 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 41:3

5. The State’s Obligation to Observe Investment Obligations Under
Umbrella Clauses
Typically, “umbrella clauses” are thought to address contracts the
state has entered into with respect to foreign investments. For example,
the U.S.-Romania BIT provides that “[e]ach Party shall observe any
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments.”59 Note,
however, that the umbrella clause requirement for governments to
observe all obligations undertaken towards investments is not as
commonly found in BITs.
While the precise meaning of the types of provisions is not yet the
subject of many cases, some tribunals have interpreted broad umbrella
clauses like the one found in the Romania-U.S. BIT, to include so-called
“unilateral undertakings” by the state reflected in laws, measures, and
obligations.60 Arguably, the various laws enacted by Eastern European
countries to protect property and compensate victims from the
Communist era are obligations these countries must respect under the
umbrella clause. Thus, a failure to abide by these obligations could
constitute a breach of a BIT that includes an umbrella clause.
C. Expropriation Remedies
BITs typically provide that “investments,” defined broadly as
discussed above, shall not be expropriated or nationalized. The definition
then goes on to list the exceptions to the general rule. Whether an
expropriation has occurred is determined on a case-by-case basis by the
tribunal. A common BIT provision provides that investments may only
be expropriated: “for a public purpose; in a nondiscriminatory manner;
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in
accordance with due process of law and the general principles of
treatment provided for in” the section of the BIT outlining the state
obligations.61 Arbitral tribunals have followed the expansion of
international law to include other types of expropriatory action by a state
other than the outright taking of property, such as legislative or judicial
measures tantamount or equivalent to expropriation. 62
59. Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. II(2)(c) (emphasis added).
60. See, e.g., SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/13, Decision, ¶166 (Aug. 6, 2003); SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic
of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision, ¶117 (Jan. 29, 2004).
61. See, e.g., Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. III(1).
62. See Franck Charles Arif v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award,
IIC 585, (Apr. 8, 2013); Rudolph Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 64, 73-4 (2002).
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States are obliged to make reparations for injuries they cause,
including “any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the
internationally wrongful act of a State.”63 The starting point for damages
for an expropriation under international law is the obligation of the state
committing the international wrong to make reparation by way of
restitution or, if this is not possible, to pay monetary compensation for
the loss sustained.64
Typically, BITs provide a standard for compensation. For example,
compensation is sometimes defined as the “equivalent of the fair market
value of the expropriated investment immediately before the
expropriatory action was taken or became known.” 65 Some BITs provide
that the compensation must be payable in a freely usable currency at the
market exchange rate, that it be paid without delay, and that it include
interest at a reasonable market rate. 66
Where the BIT claims arise out of an underlying court or
administrative proceeding, such as when the “investor” is the holder of a
claim for expropriated property and has been denied effective means,
tribunals have had to address the question of how to value those
underlying proceedings. 67 The Chorzów Factory principles have been
applied to award compensation if the claimant can prove that she would
more likely than not have prevailed on the merits before the state’s
courts.68 Thus, in some instances, the arbitral tribunal must conduct a trial
within a trial and ask itself how a competent, fair, and impartial court
would have decided the underlying claims. 69
Arbitral tribunals have substantial discretion when it comes to
awarding damages and determining the quantum of compensation. There
are various evaluation methods adopted in practice by tribunals, based on
the specific facts of the case. For example, if the investment is a business
with long-standing profitability, tribunals prefer using the discounted
cash flow method (“DCF”); whereas, in cases where the investment does
not have apparent profitability, tribunals may prefer to look at an asset-

63. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, art. 31, U.N. DOC. A/56/10 (2001).
64. See Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgement, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47
(Sept. 13).
65. See, e.g., Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. III(1).
66. See, e.g., id.
67. See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7,
Decision on Jurisdiction, (June 30, 2009) (finding that an ICC arbitration award had been
expropriated by the actions of the Bangladeshi courts).
68. See, e.g., Chevron Corporation, ¶ 374.
69. See id. ¶¶ 374-82.
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based approach, such as book value, and apply the relevant interest rate. 70
It should be noted that the question of compensation for expropriation has
been a contentious area of international law. 71 However, the general rule
that damages should provide “adequate and effective” compensation
trends in favor of the investors. Recent tribunal awards have been willing
to award damages by way of future profits, applying the discounted cash
flow method of valuation. 72
D. Dispute Resolution Procedures
Some BITs provide specific dispute resolution procedures, while
others contain no specific provisions and offer the opportunity for ad hoc
procedures.73 Some BITs also provide that a case be submitted in the first
instance to the host government’s local courts, but if the case has not been
resolved within a period of time, then the investor may pursue an
international arbitration before ICSID, 74 or some other institution.75
Other BITs allow the investor to file an international arbitration
proceeding after a specified period of time has elapsed, generally three,
six, or twelve months.76 This is sometimes referred to as a “cooling-off”
period. Many BITs prescribe that this time is to be used by the parties to
attempt to seek resolution of the investment dispute through consultation
and negotiation. 77 To start the cooling-off period, it is advisable that a
letter be sent to the relevant parties and to the highest officials of the
relevant government agencies to inform them that there is an investment
dispute and to invite them to engage in negotiations.
If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the investor may choose
to submit the dispute for resolution via binding arbitration once the
requisite cooling-off period has elapsed. BITs typically give investors a
70. See SERGEY R IPINSKY AND KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT L AW 406 (2008).
71. See Oscar Schacter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 121, 121 (1984).
72. See World Bank, Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment
of Foreign Direct Investment, in 2 FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(1992).
73. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 547.
74. See INTERNATIONAL CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, https://icsid.world
bank.org/en/# (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
75. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 8 (2008) [hereinafter
United Kingdom Model BIT] http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2847.
76. See, e.g., Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. VI(3)(a) (noting that six months must have
elapsed from the day on which the dispute arose before the claimant can submit he dispute for
settlement by binding arbitration).
77. See, e.g., id. art. VI(2) (noting that “the parties to the dispute should initially seek a
resolution through consultation and negotiation”).

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

12/12/2018 6:34 PM

Expropriation Through Investment Arbitration

697

list of options as to where the investor may submit the dispute. For
example, the U.S.-Romania BIT allows the investor to choose to submit
its case to ICSID arbitration, to the ICSID Additional Facility, to an ad
hoc arbitration using the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or “to any other
arbitration institution, or in accordance with any other arbitrations rules,
as may be mutually agreed between the parties to the dispute.”78
Many U.S. BITs provide that the investor can submit the dispute to
only one of the following: (1) to an international arbitration institution;
(2) to the local courts or administrative tribunals; or (3) to a previously
agreed upon dispute-settlement procedure.79 This provision is commonly
referred to as the “fork-in-the-road” provision because it requires the
investor to choose a dispute settlement procedure. However, tribunals
have found that this does not preclude investors from bringing all claims,
including claims for denial of justice based on the alleged mistreatment
at the hands of the local courts. 80
E. Benefits
International investment arbitration has various advantages over
domestic litigation. BITs confer international law rights directly on
individual property owners and investors and provide a procedural means
for them to take legal action directly against the host state. Claimants may
thus pursue their claims in an international forum designed to hold states
accountable under the international agreements they have entered into
with other states.
This regime provides universal standards in an impartial venue to
resolve international investment disputes without the direct involvement
of the investor’s home state. A principal advantage of BITs is the ability
for individual investors to access a tribunal outside of the host state,
taking away the host state’s hometown advantage and bias and replacing
it with a neutral forum. Removing the action from the state responsible
for perpetrating the expropriation (or that has failed to provide effective
means) diminishes the possibility of having the action tainted by
corruption or political influence. This is true at least for two of the three
arbitrators that make up a three-person arbitration panel, since the state
typically has full discretion in the selection of one of the three arbitrators.

78. See, e.g., Rom.-U.S. BIT, supra note 24, art. VI(3)(a)(iv).
79. See, e.g., id. art. VI(2).
80. See, e.g., Pantechniki S.A. Contr. & Eng’r (Greece) v. Rep. of Alb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/21, Award ¶¶ 93-4 (July 30, 2009).
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Investment arbitration decisions offer limited avenues for revision
and cannot be amended by the domestic legal system. 81 Arbitration under
the ICSID rules is wholly exempt from the supervision of local courts,
with awards subject only to an internal annulment process. 82
A final benefit is that awards rendered against states are not only
binding under the relevant BIT, but they are also readily enforceable
against host-state property worldwide as a result of the widespread
adoption of the New York and Washington (ICSID) Conventions. 83
F. Practical Limitations
In addition to the jurisdictional limits discussed above, the fees and
costs of international BIT arbitrations will limit their usefulness to
claimants whose expropriated property has insufficient value to make
international arbitration an effective remedy. Typical proceedings may
last two to three years and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars in
arbitrators’ fees and administrative fees. For example, just the filing fee
alone to submit a Request for Arbitration before ICSID is 25,000 USD.84
Thus, including attorneys’ fees and costs, bringing an international
arbitration under a BIT typically may require a multimillion-dollar
investment.
Survivors and their heirs with claims to expropriated property
should not, however, fail to seek counsel if they cannot afford such an
investment. Some attorneys and public interest groups committed to
Holocaust justice will take BIT arbitrations on contingency arrangements
and in the case of substantial recovery, third-party litigation funders may
consider funding BIT arbitrations. Thus, the opportunity exists to bring
BIT claims even though the up-front fees and costs can be substantial.
V. CONCLUSION
Providing some measure of restorative justice for survivors and their
heirs must be an urgent moral imperative for the international legal
community. For many survivors of Nazi and Communist persecution, and
for their heirs who have been thwarted by the lack of remedies to recover
81. See Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 134-35 (2006).
82. See id. at 134-55.
83. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982); Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S.
159.
84. ICSID Schedule of Fees, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Schedule-ofFees.aspx.
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their property through a functioning and fair judicial system in Poland,
Romania, and other transitional democracies, investment treaty
arbitrations are another means to be used in the quest for justice for mass
genocidal theft and restoration. BIT arbitration claims should provide an
alternative international remedy to survivors and their heirs. Holding
states accountable for their failure to provide meaningful substantive
domestic remedies for historical property expropriations may encourage
much-needed reform.

